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INTRODUCTION
Across the country, the criminal justice system is becoming both
more private and more expensive. Some prison systems have come
to rely on private contractors for electronic monitoring, probation,
pretrial services, and incarceration services.1 At the same time,
criminal justice fees are exploding, including fees charged to
inmates for their “room and board” while in prison.2 These fees,
sometimes called “pay-to-stay,” are imposed at the state and county
level, and how they are applied varies widely.3 Some take into
account inmates’ ability to pay the fees, or the effect on their
families.4 Some do not.5 Some only apply to prisoners with paying
jobs.6 Some apply to every prisoner.7 What they all have in common
is this: these fees are imposed on convicted offenders who are
statistically likely to be low income, and therefore less likely to be
able to pay.8
Because of this reality, the effects of pay-to-stay systems can be
devastating, even when the crime is comparatively minor and the
sentence is relatively short. Take the example of George Richey, a
Missouri man who spent three months in jail after a misdemeanor
conviction.9 The county charged him thirty-five dollars per day for
his stay in jail, leaving him with a bill of $3150 just for room and
board.10 Richey’s only income was a $600-per-month disability
payment, and over two years after his release from jail, he still owed
the county more than half his bill.11
1. See Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtor’s 
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 24-25 (2018); supra note 205 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
9. See Titus Wu, In Rural Missouri, Going to Jail Isn’t Free. You Pay for It, COLUMBIA
MISSOURIAN (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/state_news/in-rural-
missouri-going-to-jail-isnt-free-you-pay-for-it/article_613b219a-f4d7-11e8-bf90-33125904976d.
html [https://perma.cc/5K6B-45H6].
10. Id.
11. Id.
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In an absurd twist, because Richey could not pay the room and
board fees for his jail sentence, the county put him back in jail for
failure to pay and charged him an additional $2,275 in daily fees for
his new jail time.12 By the time Richey was released again, his debt
was higher than it had been before he began paying it down.13 He
still could not afford to pay it.14 Describing the difficulty of breaking
out of this cycle of criminal justice debt, Richey lamented that “[i]t’s
like trying to shovel in a blizzard.”15 Finally, the court told him “his
bill would only be dismissed if he agreed to serve a second 90-day
jail stay.”16 In other words, the only way to escape his pay-to-stay
debt was to volunteer to serve double the time for his original
crime.17
When pay-to-stay fees prove ruinous, as they sometimes can,
prisoners like Richey may finally have a practical constitutional
remedy. In 2019, the Supreme Court turned its attention to a long-
ignored clause of the Constitution, the Excessive Fines Clause,
which prohibits the government from imposing excessive fines on its
citizens.18 In Timbs v. Indiana, the Court declared this Clause of the
Eighth Amendment was a “safeguard [that] ... is ‘fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty’” and that it must apply to the states.19
This Note argues that in the aftermath of Timbs, current Excessive
Fines Clause doctrine can be interpreted to grant state and county
prisoners increased opportunities to bring challenges to pay-to-stay
fees. Bearing in mind the Clause’s historical background and
purpose, it is consistent with the current doctrine for prisoners to
argue that these daily fees constitute fines and that those fines are
excessive.20
Part I explains pay-to-stay fees at the state and local level
throughout the United States, providing a specific example through
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (“The last time I didn’t pay enough, I tried to explain to the court that I can’t afford
this with housing costs and everything else ... [b]ut they just keep grilling me for the money.
I’m paying it down, but I’m not paying fast enough for the judges.”).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19. 139 S. Ct. 682, 686-87 (2019) (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S 742, 767 (2010)).
20. See infra Part III.A.2.
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“subsistence fee” statutes in Florida. Part II then discusses the
history of the Excessive Fines Clause and reviews the Court’s
jurisprudence, drawing doctrinal lessons from each of the four cases
in which the Court has interpreted the Clause. Part III argues that
prisoners should be able to seek relief from pay-to-stay fees under
the Excessive Fines Clause. Part III.A argues that these fees can
constitute fines under the Clause, and that those fines can be
excessive, particularly if the Court incorporates an “ability to pay”
consideration into the evaluation of excessiveness. This Section
argues that this slight modification is consistent with the purpose
and history of the Clause, and that moral and procedural process
concerns support the change.
Finally, Part III.B argues that a doctrinal limitation on fines—
that they must be paid to the government to qualify for Clause
protection—should be reinterpreted to allow prisoners to seek relief
for payments made to private prison contractors. This can be done
by reinterpreting this requirement consistently with the Court’s
dicta in Paroline v. United States, to say that a fine does not need to
be paid to the government if the imposition of the fine sufficiently
“implicates ‘the prosecutorial powers of government.’”21 Alterna-
tively, the Court could address the increasing privatization of the
criminal justice system by adding a new requirement to the doc-
trine: that qualifying fines must be paid to the government or to an
“entity performing an essential government function at the govern-
ment’s behest.”22
I. PAY-TO-STAY ARRANGEMENTS IN STATE PENAL SYSTEMS
Broadly, “pay-to-stay” refers to the custom of charging prisoners
for their time in jail.23 Under pay-to-stay programs, prisons can
21. 572 U.S. 434, 456 (2014) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989)).
22. As will be discussed further, this requirement is inspired by, but meant to be more
liberally construed than, existing state action doctrine. See infra Part III.B.2.
23. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind
Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319, 324-26 (2014)
(explaining that “there are three different models of ‘pay-to-stay’ programs”: per-diems,
individual item charges, and upgrade fees). “Upgrade fees” refers to programs wherein
qualifying inmates may pay extra to upgrade their jail experience. See, e.g., Xuan Thai &
Tammy Leitner, Soft Cell: California Inmates Can Pay for Cushier Accommodations, NBC
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charge daily fees for costs associated with prisoner care; these fees
are often characterized as “room and board.”24 Alternatively (or
additionally), a pay-to-stay program can take a more á la carte
approach, charging for necessities like toilet paper and clothing.25
These pay-to-stay fees are part of a larger trend in American
criminal justice, where revenue-raising fees are imposed on a wide
variety of pre- and post-conviction services.26 With state and local
governments charging these fees at many stages during arrest,
conviction, and post-release supervision, “an estimated 10 million
people ... owe more than $50 billion resulting from their involve-
ment in the criminal justice system.”27
Pay-to-stay fees are a relatively new phenomenon; “room and
board” charges exploded in popularity in the 1980s and steadily
gained traction over the next three decades.28 These fees do not
replace traditional fines in criminal actions; rather they are imposed
on top of other common criminal consequences like restitution or
punitive payments.29 Though many states authorize some form of
pay-to-stay fees in state prisons or county jails (or both), there does
not appear to a be a uniform model.30 Some states authorize only
county jails to collect these fees.31 Other states take payment only
from those inmates who are employed or on work release, while
NEWS (June 18, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/soft-cell-california-
inmates-can-pay-cushier-accommodations-n773916 [https://perma.cc/54DY-NHLW] (describ-
ing some California jails as “run[ning] $250 a night [and] offer[ing] such amenities as
unlimited access to movies, books and cable TV”). Because prisoners who can afford these fees
willingly choose to pay them, this type of pay-to-stay arrangement is outside the scope of this
Note.
24. Eisen, supra note 23, at 322; see also Leah A. Plunkett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS
L.J. 57, 58-59 (2013).
25. Eisen, supra note 23, at 321.
26. Is Charging Inmates to Stay in Prison Smart Policy?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept.
9, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/charging-inmates-stay-
prison-smart-policy [https://perma.cc/J944-G2LE] (“In the last few decades, fees have pro-
liferated, such as charges for police transport, case filing, felony surcharges, electronic
monitoring, drug testing, and sex offender registration.”). 
27. Id.
28. Eisen, supra note 23, at 322.
29. Plunkett, supra note 24, at 60.
30. See generally State Analysis, 50 State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder, CRIM.
JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, HARV. L. SCH., https://cjdebtreform.org/state-analysis [https://perma.
cc/RW84-LF38] (providing a compilation of state statutes related to criminal justice debt).
31. Id. (stating that Wyoming has this policy).
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others recover fees from inmates regardless of employment status.32
Though the permutations of these programs are many, the justifica-
tions for them tend to be similar. States enact pay-to-stay fees to
help defray rapidly rising costs associated with rising prison
populations.33
Proponents of these programs point to moral and political argu-
ments in favor of this arrangement.34 First, consider some policy
alternatives: to address rising costs associated with growing prison
populations, one could either (1) reduce those costs by reducing the
prison population, or (2) raise new revenue to cover those costs.35
Faced with the complexities of comprehensive criminal justice
reform in the first case, and the unpopularity of tax increases in the
second,36 it is not hard to see why “policy makers, judges, and
sheriffs can often gain the support of constituents by supporting
inmate ‘pay-to-stay’ fees.”37 Rather than campaigning on compli-
cated systemic reforms or trying to sell tax increases to a reluctant
constituency, elected officials can propose a simple solution: if you
do the crime, you, and no one else, must be ready to pay for it.38
This logic has some intuitive appeal: if these prisoners were the
ones who committed a crime, then why should innocent, law-abiding
taxpayers have to pay for it?39 On closer inspection, the reasoning is
not so clear-cut. From a moral standpoint, one may argue that when
the citizenry chooses to punish wrongdoing with the extreme
32. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 26 (comparing, for example, Ohio, which charges
based on a general “ability to pay,” with Nevada, which allows room and board fees “[o]nly if
inmate has job or work release”). 
33. See, e.g., Alison Bo Andolena, Note, Can They Lock You Up and Charge You for It?
How Pay-to-Stay Corrections Programs May Provide a Financial Solution for New York and
New Jersey, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 94, 95 (2010).
34. Eisen, supra note 23, at 323-24.
35. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Charging Inmates Perpetuates Mass Incarceration,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 12 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-
08/Report_Charging_Inmates_Mass_Incarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q7J-RS74] (noting
that the explosion in prison populations was due to changes in criminal justice policy, and
that as “budgets grew tighter ... jurisdictions balked at increases in taxes”).
36. See id.
37. Eisen, supra note 23, at 324.
38. Id. at 323 n.27.
39. See, e.g., Michael S. Carona, Pay-To-Stay Programs in California Jails, 106 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 3-4 (2007), http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol106/iss1/30
[https://perma.cc/ZF29-4NMJ] (“I believe, and so do most citizens, that those who commit
crimes—not law-abiding taxpayers—should pay for the cost of their own incarceration.”).
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remedy of removing a fellow citizen from society, the citizenry must
bear the necessary costs of that choice.40 Beyond this moral
imperative, there is also a practical reason to view this “simple”
solution with some skepticism: these programs do not always deliver
the revenue they promise. For example, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio investigated pay-to-stay programs
in Ohio jails and found that high charges do “not translate into
higher collection rates.”41 Furthermore, the ACLU found that when
the counties employed collections agencies to recover the debt, those
agencies “impose a new cost on jails” without providing any increase
in the likelihood that the fees will be paid.42 Ohio is not alone in
finding that the revenue benefits of pay-to-stay programs may be
overstated.43
Still, supporters argue that these fees serve important purposes,
even beyond revenue. The fees can play a role in punishment,
driving home the lesson that a criminal must be prepared to pay for
their crime.44 Fees may serve a rehabilitative function by teaching
inmates lessons in responsibility.45 One may even hope that the
imposition of debt will deter future crime.46 But while deterrence
and rehabilitation are important goals, those hoping to achieve
these goals will have to reckon with a simple fact: the majority of
40. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 892 (2009) (explaining that during incarceration, “the state assumes an
ongoing affirmative obligation to meet the basic human needs of the people exiled in this
way.... If society prefers, it can choose not to incarcerate. But if it wants the benefits of
incarceration, society must bear the burden, even if this choice should oblige the state to
provide for the needs of people in prison in ways it routinely fails to do for needy people in the
free world.”).
41. ACLU OHIO, ADDING IT UP: THE FINANCIAL REALITIES OF OHIO’S PAY-TO-STAY JAIL
POLICIES 3 (2013), http://www.acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/AddingItUp2013_06.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UFM6-U8QB].
42. Id. For example, a jail facility in Fairfield County worked with a collections agency to
recoup pay-to-stay fees after release, yet “[o]nly about 15% of pay-to-stay fees charged from
2008-2011 were collected.” Id. at 4.
43. Cf. Eisen, supra note 35, at 5 (“Some agencies report actual revenues ... as low as 6
percent of the fees assessed.”).
44. Eisen, supra note 23, at 323, 323 n.27.
45. See Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 2000); see also
Eisen, supra note 23, at 323.
46. Eisen, supra note 23, at 323 n.27.
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prisoners have very little income.47 In a survey of labor outcomes
before and after incarceration, the Brookings Institution found that
“[t]wo years prior to the year they entered prison, 56 percent of
individuals have essentially no annual earnings (less than $500).”48
Post-incarceration labor statistics are equally grim, with 80 percent
of former prisoners earning less than $15,000 in the first year after
prison, and 49 percent reporting earning $500 or less.49 Imposing
debt on prisoners with little to no income “chart[s] a path back to
prison.”50 Financial insecurity and disruptive collection tactics can
cause recidivism;51 thus, those hoping to deter future crime may find
that pay-to-stay fees sometimes have the opposite effect.
It may be helpful to provide a specific example of the types of pay-
to-stay arrangements discussed in this Note. Florida state law
authorizes pay-to-stay fees in its state correctional system and “local
subdivisions.”52 Any pay-to-stay debts incurred under these statutes
“may survive against the estate of the prisoner.”53 The statutes
direct that the systems may recover “all or a fair portion of their
daily subsistence costs;”54 the law also provides for liquidated
damages for “damages and losses for incarceration costs and other
correctional costs.”55 These damages amount to fifty dollars per day
for the entire length of the imposed sentence (regardless of time
served); in the case of a life imprisonment or death sentence,
damages are capped at $250,000.56 Finally, any pay-to-stay fee
determination should consider what the prisoner can theoretically
afford, and whether the prisoner has any dependents.57 However,
47. See Adam Looney & Nicholas Turner, Work and Opportunity Before and After Incar-
ceration, BROOKINGS INST. 8 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
es_20180314_looneyincarceration_ final.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG7K-7732].
48. Id.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier
to Reentry, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 5 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt-%20A-Barrier-Reentry.pdf [https://perma.cc/73
BF-MZPU].
51. Id.
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 951.033 (West 2019).
53. § 944.485; § 951.033.
54. § 944.485; § 951.033.
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.293(2) (West 2019).
56. § 960.293(2)(a)-(b).
57. § 944.485; § 951.033.
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even when state law directs that an inmate’s ability to pay should
be taken into account, facilities may employ different methods of
doing so, with varying degrees of effectiveness.58
In the case of Florida, these fifty-dollars-per-day fees are charged
against prisoners at the government’s discretion.59 Consider Jeremy
Barrett, a former inmate who sued the Florida Department of
Corrections over a violent assault he endured in a Florida prison.60
In response to Barrett’s lawsuit, the Department filed a counter-
claim against him for $54,750—a fifty-dollars-per-day charge for
each of Barrett’s 1,095 days behind bars.61 Such bills are not limited
to lawsuits, however; a judge may still decide to impose charges on
nonlitigious prisoners.62 This is what happened to Dee Taylor,
another former inmate on a fixed income, who received a $55,000
bill after his release.63 In short, while it does not necessarily occur
in every case, applications of pay-to-stay fees like Florida’s can
result in enormous debts that may never be paid back.
II. THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE: HISTORY AND DOCTRINE
In order to understand how these pay-to-stay fees may interact
with the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, it is
important to understand where the Clause came from and how it
works. The Eighth Amendment commands that “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”64 This language, and the Clause
itself, have deep roots in English law. Section A of this Part will
discuss the Clause’s evolution from English history to American
58. See, e.g., In Jail & in Debt: Ohio’s Pay-to-Stay Fees, ACLUOHIO 2 (2015), https://www.
acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/InJailInDebt.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA9T-W8DM]
(“Ohio law states that individuals are not supposed to pay more in jail fees than they are able,
yet ... few facilities actively take indigence into consideration.”).
59. Subsistence Fees & Collection in Florida Jails, FLA. SHERIFF ’S ASS’N, https://www.fl
sheriffs.org/uploads/Subsistence%20Fee%20Final%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA5J-QT3A].
60. Tanzina Vega, Costly Prison Fees Are Putting Inmates Deep in Debt, CNN BUS.: AM.
OPPORTUNITY (Sept. 18, 2015, 2:51 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/09/18/news/economy/
prison-fees-inmates-debt/index.html [https://perma.cc/BA82-N63W].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Mr. Taylor “supports himself with Social Security payments” and, at the time of
this interview, had not paid his prison bill. Id.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
296 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:287
constitutional amendment, showing that the Clause has remained
remarkably consistent over centuries. Section B will then explore
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Clause. This Section will
outline the Excessive Fines Clause doctrine, explaining the modern
rules for what constitutes a “fine,” and when a fine is “excessive.”
A. Historical Background of the Excessive Fines Clause
James Madison proposed the language of the Eighth Amendment
to the First Congress in June of 1789, but “[i]f Madison and his
colleagues could draw up [a] classic inventory of basic rights [in the
Bill of Rights], it was because they were the heirs of the constitu-
tional struggles waged by their English forebears.”65 Madison and
his compatriots did not construct the Bill of Rights on barren
ground; they built upon foundations laid in England.66 These
foundations begin in the thirteenth century with the Magna Carta.67
Drafted in 1215, the Magna Carta stands as the first written
instrument in English history to declare that the people held certain
rights not even the king could violate.68 Though the document itself
does not contain all—or even most—of those rights enshrined in the
modern Bill of Rights,69 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has observed
that “[t]he Excessive Fines Clause traces its venerable lineage back
to at least 1215, when [the] Magna Carta guaranteed that ‘[a] Free-
man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of
the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to
him his [livelihood].’”70 These explicit terms promised that no man
would pay a fine disproportionate to his crime; nor would he be
deprived of his livelihood by fines.71
65. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (1971).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4 (“To an American interested in the English antecedents of the federal Bill of
Rights, the obvious starting point is the Magna Carta itself.”).
68. Id.; see also id. at 7 (“[T]he Charter itself tells us that ... ‘here is a law which is above
the King and which even he must not break.’”).
69. Id. at 4.
70. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (quoting § 20, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14, in 1 Eng.
Stat. at Large 5 (1225)). To be “amerced” means to be “punish[ed] by a fine whose amount is
fixed by the court.” Amerce, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/amerce [https://perma.cc/RAB4-MEG9].
71. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688.
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Despite this unequivocal ban on excessive fines, English sover-
eigns continued to impose them.72 By the seventeenth century, the
reigning Stuart kings had become notorious for “using large fines to
raise revenue, harass their political foes, and indefinitely detain
those unable to pay.”73 The Stuarts were forced to abdicate and
parliamentary leaders drafted a list of grievances in response to the
king’s lawlessness, including complaints about his use of enormous
fines.74 These grievances became the English Declaration of Rights,
which “declared in its tenth article: ‘[t]hat excessive [b]ail ought not
to be required, nor excessive [f]ines imposed; nor cruel and unusual
[p]unishments inflicted.’”75 The Declaration’s statutory counterpart,
the English Bill of Rights, was enacted in 1689.76
In 1769, William Blackstone commented that the excessive fines
article of the English Bill of Rights affirmed “the old constitutional
law”—the Magna Carta—and reasoned that fines should follow the
Magna Carta’s dictate to be proportional to the offender, not just the
offense.77 He observed that a fine was excessive based on the
offense, the offender’s condition, and any other applicable circum-
stances.78 The English Bill of Rights then “served as a model for the
Virginia Declaration of Rights,”79 and the Constitution’s Excessive
Fines Clause itself was copied directly from that Declaration.80
During the First Congress, the Excessive Fines Clause was not
controversial.81 Indeed, the majority of the original states, not just
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing The Grand Remonstrance ¶¶ 17, 34 (1641), in THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1625-1660, 210, 212 (S. Gardiner ed., 3d ed. rev.
1906)).
74. John D. Bessler, A Century in the Making: The Glorious Revolution, The American
Revolution, and the Origins of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, 27 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 989, 1001-02, 1008 (2019).
75. Id. at 1008 (quoting Laurence Claus, Methodology, Proportionality, Equality: Which
Moral Question Does the Eighth Amendment Pose? 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 38 (2008)).
76. Id. at 1009.
77. Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 862 (2013) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 1979)).
78. Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *371).
79. Bessler, supra note 74, at 997.
80. Eisen, supra note 23, at 332.
81. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989); see also
David Lieber, Eighth Amendment—The Excessive Fines Clause, 84 J.CRIM.L.&CRIMINOLOGY
805, 808 (1994) (“Although the Eighth Amendment provides a substantive check on the
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Virginia, already had similar clauses in their governing
documents.82 Because the Clause was uncontroversial, there is little
record of discussion or debate on the Clause’s meaning.83 But while
there was no universal practice regarding what was an “excessive
fine,” early American history shows that “fines” were not limited to
payments to government.84 For example, in 1791, a South Carolina
law decreed that the punishment for “swindling” would be a “fine;”
specifically, a “fine” of twice the amount taken, paid to the victim,
not the state.85
Further, while the record is limited, “some state statutes show an
explicit link to the Magna Carta's prohibition against defendant
impoverishment.... An inability to pay and the effect on one’s family
were also [sometimes] treated as mitigating factors at sentencing
and upon later petition for relief.”86 Looking past the colonial period,
there is evidence this view persisted, if not exclusively; some
commentators, lawmakers, and state courts cited Blackstone and
the Magna Carta’s definitions even after the American Civil War.87
The Eighth Amendment does not explicitly include the Magna
Carta’s admonition to preserve an offender’s livelihood.88 However,
neither did the English Bill of Rights upon which it was based, and
there is evidence that it was understood to be implicit in the concept
sovereign power to interfere with individual liberty ... the Excessive Fines Clause prohibition
has received very little attention either from the framers of the Constitution or from the
Supreme Court.” (internal citation omitted)).
82. Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 264 n.5 (citing 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 235, 272, 278, 282, 287, 300, 343, 379 (1971)).
83. See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 297
(2014).
84. Id. at302-03 (“The actual practice in the colonies and early American states belies the
[Supreme] Court's restriction of fines to sanctions payable to the sovereign.... For some con-
victions, in fact, statutes contemplated that pecuniary penalties go entirely to parties other
than the sovereign.”).
85. Id. at 305. Colgan provides other similar examples from this period, including a
Georgia law that awarded half of a punitive “fine” to the victim of a “biting, gouging, or
maiming,” and a Delaware statute that fined public guardians for neglect, passing half of that
fine on to the minor child injured by such neglect. Id. at 306-07. In each case, the fee was
called a “fine” in the statute. Id. at 305, 306-07 n.156-58. Because the Supreme Court
interprets (for Clause purposes) a “fine” as a payment to the government, and this Note
argues the scope of a fine should be broader than government-only payments, these examples
are very much worth noting. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1.a and III.B.
86. Colgan, supra note 83, at 330-31.
87. McLean, supra note 77, at 883-84.
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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of “excessive.”89 The colonial period also contains anecdotal evidence
that excessive fines were understood as proportional to the of-
fender.90 That interpretation is consistent with the historical
pedigree and the ultimate purpose of the Clause—to prevent the
sovereign from using massive fines to “raise revenue [or] harass
their political foes.”91
B. Excessive Fines Clause Doctrine Today
United States courts have virtually ignored the Excessive Fines
Clause for the majority of the country’s history,92 and the Supreme
Court did not interpret the Clause until 1989.93 Indeed, the body of
law surrounding the Excessive Fines Clause is so small that the
Clause was not incorporated against the states until 2019, in Timbs
v. Indiana.94 There, the Court stated:
[T]he protection against excessive fines guards against abuses
of government's punitive or criminal-law-enforcement authority.
This safeguard, we hold, is “fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty,” with “dee[p] root[s] in [our] history and tradi-
tion.” The Excessive Fines Clause is therefore incorporated by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.95
But how, precisely, does the Excessive Fines Clause function as a
“safeguard”? In attempting to understand the Clause’s protections,
one must first answer two essential questions about the meaning of
the Clause: (1) what is a “fine,” and (2) when is a fine “excessive”?
89. See McLean, supra note 77 and accompanying text.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86.
91. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019); see also supra text accompanying note
73.
92. McLean, supra note 77, at 833.
93. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989)
(“[T]his Court has never considered an application of the Excessive Fines Clause.”).
94. See 139 S. Ct. at 686-87. Despite its recency, Timbs is not included in the following
discussion of Clause doctrine; the Court granted certiorari only on the question of whether the
Clause applies to the states. See id. at 686. 
95. Id. at 686-87 (alteration in original except first bracket) (quoting McDonald v. Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
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The Supreme Court has provided limited clarification on both of
these vital analytical questions within their holdings in four cases.96
This Section will explore each of those four cases, explaining the
shape of the current doctrine.
1. What Is a “Fine”?
In order to determine whether a fee runs afoul of the Excessive
Fines Clause, one must first understand what types of fees or for-
feitures qualify as “fines” under the Clause. This Section will ex-
plain the current understanding of a “fine” by describing the three
Supreme Court cases that have thus far attempted to define the
term: Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal,97
Austin v. United States,98 and Alexander v. United States.99 Through
these cases—the first to interpret the Clause—the Court has
provided some clarity regarding who may impose (or receive) a
“fine,” and for what purpose.
a. Browning-Ferris Industries: “Payment to a
Sovereign as Punishment for Some Offense”
The first Supreme Court decision to interpret the Excessive Fines
Clause was Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Dis-
posal, Inc. in 1989.100 In that case, respondents had sued petitioner
Browning-Ferris Industries in federal court, alleging antitrust
violations and interference with contractual relations under state
tort law.101 A jury found for respondents and awarded $6 million in
punitive damages.102 The petitioner appealed the verdict, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether the
punitive damages were unconstitutionally excessive.103
96. Colgan, supra note 83, at 281, 281 & n.11 (explaining that current Excessive Fines
Clause doctrine comes from “a quartet of Supreme Court cases decided between 1989 and
1998”).
97. 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989).
98. 509 U.S. 602, 610-11 (1993).
99. 509 U.S. 544, 558 (1993).
100. 492 U.S. at 262.
101. Id. at 260-62.
102. Id. at 262.
103. Id.
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The Court discussed the Clause’s history, noting that the lack of
debate at the time of the framing left modern courts with an
“absence of direct evidence of Congress’ intended meaning.”104 In
that absence, the Court instead sought the original meaning of the
word “fine”; a fine, the Court observed, was “a payment to a sov-
ereign as punishment for some offense.”105
The Court also relied on the original purpose of the entire
amendment: to limit government power.106 “Simply put, the primary
focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential for governmental
abuse of its ‘prosecutorial’ power.”107 Finally, the Court looked to the
historical lineage of the Clause. Because it was based on language
that originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689—language
drafted in direct response to government abuses—the Court
observed that the history supported a limited, government-only
interpretation of the Clause.108 Ultimately, because of the historical
definition of “fine,” and the “concerns that animate the Eighth
Amendment,” the Court held that punitive fines in civil cases
between private parties were outside the scope of the Clause’s
protection.109 They were simply not the type of “fines” the Clause
was meant to combat.110 “[T]he Excessive Fines Clause was intended
to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the
government.”111
After Browning-Ferris Industries, it was clear that while the
Court had not explicitly ruled out “extend[ing] the scope of the
Excessive Fines Clause beyond the context where the Framers
clearly intended it to apply,” the Court’s “fine” analysis in Excessive
Fines Clause cases would nonetheless be guided by a framework
built on the historical purpose of the Clause and a contemporaneous
understanding of the language.112 But beyond the limitation
established in Browning-Ferris Industries, it remained unclear
104. Id. at 264-65.
105. Id. at 265.
106. Id. at 266.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 266-67.
109. Id. at 266-67, 275.
110. Id. at 266-67.
111. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 273-76.
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what, precisely, constituted a “fine” within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment.
b. Austin v. United States; Alexander v. United States:
Forfeitures and Punitive Versus Remedial Intent
The Court’s next opportunity to clarify “fines” came in 1993 with
Austin v. United States.113 In that case, petitioner Austin had
received a seven-year prison sentence for cocaine possession.114
Shortly thereafter, the government filed suit in federal court to
compel Austin’s forfeiture of both his business (an auto body shop)
and his mobile home.115 Austin argued that the forfeiture would
violate the Excessive Fines Clause.116 Both the District Court and
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that civil in rem forfeitures
were not “fines” covered by the Eighth Amendment.117 Because this
holding created a circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.118
The government argued that the Excessive Fines Clause could not
apply in civil cases.119 In response, the Court returned to Browning-
Ferris Industries’ discussion of the Clause’s purpose and history.120
Affirming that “[t]he Excessive Fines Clause limits the govern-
ment's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as
113. 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 604-05. Federal prosecutors did so pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881, which in
relevant part authorizes the government to seek forfeiture of vehicles and real property used
to facilitate certain drug offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7) (2012). According to the govern-
ment, after Austin agreed to sell drugs to a customer at his shop, he retrieved cocaine from
his mobile home and returned to the body shop to complete the transaction. Austin, 509 U.S.
at 605. These actions formed the basis of the government’s argument that the mobile home
and body shop “facilitated” a drug crime and were thus subject to forfeiture under the statute.
See id.
116. Austin, 509 U.S. at 605.
117. Id. at 605-06.
118. Id. at 606.
119. Id. at 607. The government did allow for one exception to its proposed rule: the
Excessive Fines Clause could apply in civil proceedings if “that proceeding is so punitive that
it must be considered criminal.” Id. As the Court rejected the government’s position in its
entirety, it was unnecessary to consider whether this exception would apply. Id.
120. Id. at 608.
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punishment for some offense,’”121 the Court held that the relevant
question was not whether a fine or forfeiture was imposed in a civil
(versus criminal) proceeding.122 Instead, the crucial question is
whether that fine is intended “at least in part as punishment.”123
Further, the Court held, even a fine with both remedial and
punitive purposes would be sufficient to meet this standard.124
Using this standard, the in rem forfeiture of Austin’s property
constituted a “fine” under the Clause.125 Furthermore, in Alexander
v. United States, decided the same day as Austin, the Court ruled
that an “in personam criminal forfeiture ... is clearly a form of
monetary punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment pur-
poses, from a traditional ‘fine.’”126 The Court simply cited to the logic
explained in Austin to support this conclusion.127
Austin and Alexander clarified that under the Excessive Fines
Clause, a “fine” was indeed “payment to a sovereign as punishment
for some offense,” and, as such, an intent to punish was a necessary
element of such fines in any proceeding.128 The next Subsection will
discuss the rule for determining when such punitive forfeitures or
fines are “excessive.”
2. When Is a Fine “Excessive”?
Through the preceding cases, it is clear that a fine must be (1)
paid to the sovereign, not to a private party; (2) in cash or in kind;
(3) intended at least partially as punishment; and (4) imposed in
either a criminal or civil proceeding.129 Once a fine is determined to
be a “fine” within the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause, however,
an important question remains: when is that fine unconstitutionally
excessive?
121. Id. at 609-10 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 265 (1989)).
122. Id. at 610.
123. Id. at 610-11 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 610.
125. Id. at 621-22.
126. 509 U.S. 544, 558 (1993).
127. Id. at 558-59 (“Accord Austin.”).
128. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)); Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558.
129. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1.a and II.B.1.b.
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To date, the Court’s only attempt to answer that question came
in United States v. Bajakajian.130 In that case, the Court applied the
Excessive Fines Clause for the first time.131 The controversy began
when respondent Bajakajian was traveling through the Los Angeles
airport with his family.132 At the airport, United States customs
investigators searched the family’s luggage, recovering $357,144 in
cash from the search.133 Bajakajian pled guilty to a federal charge
of failing to report the currency.134 In response, the government
sought forfeiture of the entire cache—more than thirty-five times
the statutory minimum amount.135
The Court first determined that the forfeiture was indeed a
“fine”136 and pointed to several factors that had made the designa-
tion an easy one.137 The money forfeiture was “imposed at the
culmination of a criminal proceeding ... require[d] conviction of an
underlying felony, and [could not] be imposed upon an innocent
owner of unreported currency,” only on one who had been convicted
130. 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“Until today ... we have not articulated a standard for
determining whether a punitive forfeiture is constitutionally excessive.”), superseded by
statute, USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). It is important to note
that the Excessive Fines Clause test articulated in this case was not superseded. Central to
the reasoning in Bajakajian was that the Court understood Bajakajian’s crime—failure to
report that he was carrying over $10,000 in cash—as being relatively harmless. See id. at 339.
Congress disagreed, and in response to the Court’s holding, created a new statutory crime:
“bulk cash smuggling.” USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (relevant
section codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5332 (2012)); see also United States v. Jose, 499
F.3d 105, 109-11 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining how the result in Bajakajian influenced § 5332
and observing that the statute “makes clear that Congress has now prohibited what it calls
‘bulk cash smuggling,’ and that it considers this to be a very serious offense” (emphasis
added)). Thus, the Court’s test stands, but the gravity of Bajakajian’s specific offense has
changed.
131. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327 (“This Court has had little occasion to interpret, and has
never actually applied, the Excessive Fines Clause.”).
132. Id. at 324.
133. Id. at 325.
134. Id. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2012) (codifying the reporting requirement).
135. § 5316 (setting the minimum required amount at $10,000); Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at
325.
136. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328-34.
137. Id. at 328.
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of the felony of failure to report.138 Therefore, there was sufficient
punitive intent for a “fine.”139
The Court then turned to the question of whether the fine was
excessive.140 The Court observed that “[t]he touchstone of the
constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the
principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear
some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to
punish.”141 But the judiciary would have limited discretion to
determine whether a fine was disproportionate, because “judgments
about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first
instance to the legislature.”142 Therefore, to preserve that required
deference to the legislature, the Court held, “a punitive forfeiture
violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to
the gravity of a defendant's offense.”143 In other words, courts cannot
strike down financial penalties imposed by the legislature—even
disproportionate ones—unless those penalties are not merely
disproportionate, but exceptionally so.144
The Court did not identify any rigid requirements of the “grossly
disproportional” test.145 Still, in ruling Bajakajian’s $357,144
forfeiture unconstitutionally excessive, it identified several factors
it considered relevant to his case: Bajakajian was not within “the
class of persons for whom the statute was principally designed”; the
statutory maximum penalties for the crime of failure to report were
minimal (6 months in jail, $5,000 fine); and the harm caused to the
138. Id. The Court has also held that forfeiture statutes that “provide an ‘innocent owner’
defense ... focus [their] provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes them
look more like punishment.” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993).
139. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328.
140. Id. at 334.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 336 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (“Reviewing courts, of
course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.” (emphasis added))).
This observation seems particularly relevant in light of Congress’s post-Bajakajian legislation
overriding the Court’s “gravity of the offense” determination in that case. See supra note 130
and accompanying text.
143. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added).
144. Id. The “grossly disproportional” test is also the standard in cruel and unusual
punishment cases; the Court cites the same need for judicial deference to the legislature when
evaluating the nonfinancial punishments implicated in that clause of the Eighth Amendment.
See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
145. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-40.
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government was slight.146 Because the forfeiture was “larger than
the $5,000 fine imposed by the District Court by many orders of
magnitude, and it [bore] no articulable correlation to any injury
suffered by the Government,” it was unconstitutional.147
Looking at these cases together, it is evident that in order to
trigger the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause, a fine or
forfeiture must be punitive in nature, not the result of a civil action
between private parties, and grossly disproportional to the offense.
In so holding, the Court was guided by the history and purpose of
the Clause, which has existed in one form or another since the
Magna Carta and endures to limit abuses of the government’s
“prosecutorial power.”148 Using this framework, the next Part will
explore how the Excessive Fines Clause can provide case-by-case
remedies to a population in need of relief.
III. APPLICATION OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO STATE
PAY-TO-STAY PROGRAMS
This Part argues that prisoners should be able to make as-applied
challenges to pay-to-stay fees under the Excessive Fines Clause.
First, any current judicial understanding of these fines as mere non-
punitive fees should be adjusted, because nonpunitive rationales for
the fees do not survive scrutiny if the fees are relatively high. Thus,
in certain cases, prisoners can and should argue that the fees are
punitive fines. Section A.2 argues that an “ability to pay” prong,
sometimes referred to as “deprivation of livelihood,” should be
included in the test courts use to evaluate whether a fine is “grossly
disproportional.” This Section argues that such a prong is consistent
with the historical purpose of the Clause as well as morally and
politically appropriate. Then, Section B addresses the concern that
the Clause may not apply to fees imposed or collected by private
prison industry contractors, arguing that Supreme Court dicta and
the Clause’s history support application of the Clause to private
contractors. Alternatively, an “essential government function” test
146. Id. at 338-39. 
147. Id. at 339-40.
148. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989);
supra Part II.A.
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should be incorporated into the Clause’s framework with the explicit
aim of targeting prison industry privatization.
A. Case-by-Case Grounds for Relief
This Section argues that the current, post-incorporation Excessive
Fines Clause doctrine leaves room for state prisoners to challenge
pay-to-stay fees on an as-applied basis. Subsection 1 argues that
typical justifications for pay-to-stay fees, such as those elaborated
in Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility, do not foreclose
the necessary showing of partially punitive intent; these fees can
indeed be fines. Subsection 2 argues that the “grossly dispropor-
tional” test of excessiveness should be understood to include the
prisoner’s ability to pay, because the Clause’s history supports this
construction. Finally, it argues that both process problems and
practical concerns support this liberal interpretation of the Clause.
1. Remedial Fees Versus Punitive Fines
Recall that in order to fall under the Excessive Fines Clause’s
protection, a financial penalty must be at least partially punitive.149
Thus, the first hurdle a former prisoner must overcome is this: they
must show the pay-to-stay fees imposed were intended, at least in
part, to punish them for their crime. In doing so, a prisoner may
face many potential counterarguments from their government
opposition: for example, that the charges are mere reimbursement
for government costs; that the charges are intended to serve a
rehabilitative purpose by teaching responsibility; or that subsis-
tence charges cannot be punishment because, in prison or outside,
humans necessarily incur daily costs for food and shelter.150
For a demonstration of these arguments in action, look to Tillman
v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility.151 In that case, the Third
Circuit held that a jail’s daily fee of ten dollars did not constitute an
149. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
150. See, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 2000).
151. See id. at 417-21; see also Eisen, supra note 23, at 334 (describing Tillman as “[t]he
seminal case in jail fee jurisprudence”).
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excessive fine because it was neither excessive nor a fine.152
Specifically, the fee was not a fine because “the fees are designed to
teach financial responsibility. More fundamentally, the fees can
hardly be called fines when they merely represent partial reim-
bursement of the prisoner’s daily cost of maintenance, something he
or she would be expected to pay on the outside.”153 Twelve years
later, in Carson v. Mulvihill, the court affirmed this finding, holding
that the “financial responsibility” and “daily cost of maintenance”
rationales justified these fees generally, and not merely in Tillman’s
specific case.154
These statements were the extent of the court’s response to the
petitioner’s Excessive Fines Clause argument, but upon closer
examination, both rationales lack persuasive power. Tillman and
Carson argue that pay-to-stay fees serve the legitimate government
interest of “teach[ing] financial responsibility,”155 but this argument
cannot be categorically correct. If “financial responsibility” implies,
at minimum, that one will not spend more than one earns, it may be
useful to look at earning capacity in the prison facilities that charge
these fees. The Prison Policy Initiative (PPI) reported that in 2017
the average minimum daily wage for “non-industry prison jobs” was
just eighty-six cents.156 The average maximum was three dollars and
152. Tillman, 221 F.3d at 420-21.
153. Id. at 420. The court also observed that the fees did not seem to be punishment
because they “[did] not vary with the gravity of the offense.” Id. Putting aside the fact that the
total fees ultimately do vary with the offense (because longer terms of incarceration would
result in more money owed), this Note does not address this argument because the Tillman
court itself backed away from it by stating “[w]e will not speculate on the result we would
reach where the offense was significantly less serious, or where the daily fees or total debt
were significantly higher.” Id. at 421.
154. See No. 10-1470, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14540, at *20 (3d Cir. July 16, 2012) (“[W]e
[have] specifically held that such fees are not punishment, but are rather ‘designed to teach
financial responsibility.’ Furthermore, we explained that ‘[m]ore fundamentally, the fees can
hardly be called fines when they merely represent partial reimbursement of the prisoner’s
daily cost of maintenance, something he or she would be expected to pay on the outside.’”
(third alteration in original) (quoting Tillman, 221 F.3d at 420)).
155. See id.; Tillman, 221 F.3d at 420.
156. Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/ [https://perma.
cc/R9GZ-BZC7].
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forty-five cents.157 Yet pay-to-stay fees across the country are often
significantly higher than these wages.158
For a more specific hypothetical example, look to Pennsylvania,
where Tillman was incarcerated.159 PPI reports that the highest
possible hourly wage in the Pennsylvania state prison system in
2017 was one dollar per hour.160 According to the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, the standard prison work week is six
hours per day, five days per week.161 Finally, assume a daily fee in
the same amount as Tillman’s: ten dollars.162 During one year of
confinement, assuming the maximum possible salary, an inmate in
this position would have earned $1560 (before any applicable
deductions) and yet would have accumulated $3650 in daily fees.
This equates to a debt-to-income ratio of 2.3 to 1.163 How is a
prisoner supposed to demonstrate “financial responsibility” when
the state has decreed their costs will exceed their income by more
than 200 percent? Returning to the Florida example, the ratio is
even more stark. Though the state is entitled to recover up to fifty
dollars per day in fees (just over $18,000 annually), most prison jobs
in the state are unpaid.164 Though some non-industry jobs are
compensated, the maximum pay rate does not exceed fifty dollars
per month.165
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
159. See Tillman, 221 F.3d at 413.
160. State and Federal Prison Wage Policies and Sourcing Information, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/wage_policies.html [https://
perma.cc/283A-LD8R]. It is worth noting that this maximum salary was reserved for members
of the “Asbestos Abatement Crew.” Id.
161. DEP’T OF CORRS., COMMONWEALTH OF PA., INMATE COMPENSATION MANUAL § 1(C)(1)
(2012), https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/816%20Inmate%20
Compensation.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG9W-9CL8].
162. Tillman, 221 F.3d at 413.
163. This is a purely hypothetical scenario, given that Tillman himself was held in a county
jail and the employment policies cited here are applicable to state, not county, facilities. Id.
at 413; DEP’T OF CORRS., COMMONWEALTH OF PA., supra note 161. However, ten dollars is not
an unreasonable amount to cite for such a hypothetical given that these fees can actually be
much higher. See, e.g., Katherine G. Porter, Note, A “Debt” to Society?: Reassessing the
Constitutionality of Pay-to-Stay Programs in Ohio Jails and Prisons, 44 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
415, 418 (2018) (describing an Ohio correctional facility that charges inmates $72.67 per day). 
164. PRISON POL’YINITIATIVE,supra note 160; see supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
165. PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, supra note 160. This is a debt-to-income ratio of, at best, 30
to 1.
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In describing these examples, this Note does not argue pay-to-
stay fee policies cannot be constructed to teach financial responsibil-
ity. One can imagine a scenario where fees are sufficiently low to be
manageable on a prisoner’s scant salary, or perhaps where fees are
charged in reasonable and accurate proportion to a prisoner’s liquid
assets at the time of incarceration.166 But there are no data to
support the assertion that pay-to-stay actually does have a salutary
effect on financial responsibility.167 Further, when these systems can
result in such dramatic disparities in debt and income, it is illogical
to accept a remedial “financial responsibility” rationale at face
value. Generally, that rationale “is a mere political tool which exists
to mask the punitive nature of pay-to-stay. The practice of fostering
inmate accountability via saddling inmates—who already face
barriers to reentry into society—with exorbitant debts appears to
run directly counter to the goal of holding individuals financially
accountable.”168 Thus, when a state argues that these fees are not
punitive fines under the Excessive Fines Clause because they serve
this remedial educational purpose, courts should not accept the
state’s assertions without inquiring into the as-applied effect of the
program. It is clear, at least in some cases, that pay-to-stay fees are
not only incapable of teaching financial responsibility, but they
actively undermine that educational goal.169
Next, turn to the argument that pay-to-stay fees for “daily cost
of maintenance” are by definition not fines. This argument is
166. Recall that though some pay-to-stay statutes currently do direct that the prisoner’s
finances should be taken into account, such statutes typically do not mandate how such
determinations should be made and their effectiveness and accuracy can vary widely. See, e.g.,
Wu, supra note 9 (“‘Generally what you see in many states is that these indigency deter-
minations are not done quickly or upfront’.... It’s only after a warrant is issued for failure to
pay after all the debt has accumulated that the court later determines one is indigent. ‘It’s
legally compliant because the courts can say, “Oh, we didn’t know they were indigent at the
time we charged them”’”); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
167. Joshua Michtom, Note, Making Prisoners Pay for Their Stay: How a Popular
Correctional Program Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, 13B.U.PUB. INT.L.J.187,200 (2004)
(“No studies have been conducted to determine whether inmates in pay-to-stay facilities
manage their money more responsibly during or after incarceration.... Just as when a parent
tells a wayward child, ‘I’m going to teach you a lesson!’ she intends not to educate but to
punish, the ‘teaching’ explanation for pay-to-stay is, in truth, punitive.”).
168. Porter, supra note 163, at 428.
169. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. Note also that because the Clause
requires only partial punitive intent, even if financial responsibility is accepted as a rationale,
one still may be able to show an additional punitive intent. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
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potentially fatal to pay-to-stay fee claims under the Excessive Fines
Clause. To be considered a “fine” under the Clause, a fee must have
at least a partially punitive intent.170 But the argument that pay-to-
stay fees are “by definition” not fines would foreclose a showing of
any punitive intent.
What this “by definition” argument ignores, however, is the power
of choice. Outside prison walls, one may choose to spend or save as
necessary. For example, a person might live with family or be
dependent on others for support. According to one study, in the five
years prior to entering prison, the majority of men bring in annual
earnings below the federal poverty line.171 One year before prison,
84 percent earned less than $500.172 Bearing in mind these economic
realities, it becomes difficult to argue that, for example, a fifty-
dollars-per-day fee is equivalent to what one would have to spend on
the outside, when it is clear many of the affected prisoners would
not have had the ability to do so.
Moreover, while daily pay-to-stay fees are generally limited to
costs of inmate housing and food,173 these costs can include things
such as staff salaries, inmate programs, and management.174 These
additional costs inherent in prison housing make it even more
difficult to argue that daily prison fees are equivalent to what one
would pay outside. Of course, one may argue that prisoners deserve
to pay these costs. Perhaps they do—but again, that is a punitive
rationale.
Ultimately, it is not enough to say prisoners would have to pay
their way on the outside. There must be a point at which daily fees
are not insulated from review by the application of the seemingly
innocuous label of “room and board”; a point at which fees that far
exceed what one could or did pay in the outside world do indeed
become punitive fines. By showing that pay-to-stay fees, as applied,
170. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
171. See Looney & Turner, supra note 47, at 10; 2019 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://aspe.hhs.gov/2019-poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/
CFL3-C9MZ] (setting the poverty threshold for a single-person home at $12,490/year).
172. Looney & Turner, supra note 47, at 10.
173. See supra Part I.
174. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM FY 2019 PERFORMANCE BUDGET
19 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1034421/download [https://perma.cc/7FDM-
YN4T] (including food, clothing, staff salaries, and operational costs in the category of “Inmate
Care and Programs” costs).
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are too high to reasonably serve this “by definition” rationale—or
the rehabilitative purpose discussed above—a prisoner should be
able to successfully argue that the fees are partially punitive under
the Clause.
It is also worth noting that the reasoning in Bajakajian supports
the idea that pay-to-stay fees can be punitive. In Bajakajian, the
Court determined that a forfeiture was a fine because it was the
result of a criminal proceeding and because conviction of an
underlying crime was a requirement.175 Pay-to-stay fees imposed for
post-conviction imprisonment clearly meet this threshold. The
government in Bajakajian also argued that the forfeiture served a
remedial deterrence interest.176 The Court rejected this argument,
observing that deterrence is a traditional “goal of punishment.”177
Thus, to the extent that supporters argue that pay-to-stay fees have
a deterrent effect,178 the Court would find punitive intent.
Because the rehabilitative and “by definition” arguments are
unpersuasive in certain cases, because deterrence is a punitive goal,
and because one argument for pay-to-stay is that prisoners deserve
to pay the fees,179 prisoners should be able to show that imposed fees
have the required partially punitive intent under the Clause.
2. A New Understanding of the “Grossly Disproportional Test”
Having shown that a pay-to-stay fee is a fine, a prisoner would
next have to show that the fine is “grossly disproportional to the
gravity of [the] offense.”180 There is no specific rule or ratio defining
what is “grossly disproportional,” and therefore this test is highly
fact-bound.181 This Subsection argues that when performing this
fact-bound inquiry, courts should incorporate an “ability to pay”
prong into the “grossly disproportional” test.
175. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text; see also Porter, supra note 163, at 431.
176. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998), superseded by statute, USA
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
177. Id.
178. See Eisen, supra note 23, at 323.
179. See, e.g., Carona, supra note 39.
180. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
181. Porter, supra note 163, at 434.
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The Court, in establishing the current standard, declared that
legislatures should determine appropriate punishment for a crime,
not courts.182 Thus, some courts have judged the excessiveness of a
fine with reference to the maximum fine set by the legislature.183 In
Tillman, for example, the court concluded that Tillman’s fine was
not excessive because his $4,000 debt paled in comparison to the
$100,000 statutory maximum for his crime.184 Based on this rea-
soning, it seems clear that fines exceeding the statutory maximum
are open to as-applied challenges.
What about fines that do not exceed that threshold, but nonethe-
less saddle prisoners with virtually unpayable debt? If “[t]he
touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines
Clause is the principle of proportionality”185—in other words, if it is
constitutionally vital that the financial punishment fit the
crime—then it is imperative to consider that the same financial
sanction punishes different people differently for identical crimes.
One’s degree of suffering when faced with a fine will, of course,
depend entirely on their personal access to wealth.
A circuit split has developed with respect to this issue. While
most circuits to consider the question have held that “grossly
disproportional” depends on the characteristics of the crime, not the
criminal, the First and Second Circuits have included “whether the
forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his livelihood” in their
proportionality tests.186 In doing so, these courts relied on the
history of the Clause and concluded that this “livelihood” require-
ment was “deeply rooted” in the Eighth Amendment.187 The goal of
the Clause and its antecedents was not just to avoid enormous fines;
instead, the laws upon which the Clause is based specifically
targeted fines that were “ruinous.”188 It is clear the Magna Carta
prioritized the balance between punishment and livelihood,189 and
182. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 420-21 (3d Cir. 2000).
184. Id.
185. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added).
186. See United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v.
Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83-85 (1st Cir. 2008); see also McLean, supra note 77, at 846.
187. Levesque, 546 F.3d at 83-84.
188. Id. at 84 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
290 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
189. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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these rulings correctly conclude that the subsequent history
supports prioritizing this balance today.190
A “deprivation of livelihood” or “ability to pay” prong would
necessarily result in the potential for more claims under the Clause;
this, of course, is the point. This tweak to the doctrine, however,
may trigger concerns about judicial efficiency. With pay-to-stay
programs in state and local jails across the country,191 more
claimants may flood the courts. “But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency,”192 and in any case, to the
extent that successful claims may reduce recidivism193 and deter
states from setting high fees, the increase in volume may be
temporary.
Furthermore, this doctrinal tweak is not inconsistent with
Bajakajian because the Court in that case did not rule out a
“livelihood” analysis.194 It simply did not reach the question.195
Bajakajian argued that the forfeiture was excessive by any metric
and the Court agreed.196 Therefore, the opinion did not address the
livelihood component, leaving open the possibility that it may be
analytically relevant in future cases.197
It is true, however, that the Court’s opinion did discuss the
importance of giving significant deference to the legislature in the
determination of appropriate punishments, including fines and
forfeitures.198 This strongly stated concern—fundamentally, preser-
vation of the separation of powers between courts and the legisla-
ture—would seem to suggest that courts should not take on a larger
190. See Beth A. Colgan & Nicholas M. McLean, Financial Hardship and the Excessive
Fines Clause: Assessing the Severity of Property Forfeitures After Timbs, 129 YALE L.J.F. 430,
433-37 (2020) (describing the Court’s heavy reliance on the Clause’s history and that this
history supports the “constitutional relevance of financial hardship”). 
191. See supra Part I.
192. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
193. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay,
103 IOWA L. REV. 53, 72-73 (2017) (“[U]nmanageable economic sanctions ... drain defendants'
[sic] and their families of necessary resources, thus creating or exacerbating financial insta-
bility. Such instability has also been linked to increases in recidivism and participation in
crime.”).
194. McLean, supra note 77, at 847.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 847-48.
198. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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role in evaluating the legislature’s imposition of pay-to-stay fees.
But such deference to the legislature does not seem entirely
appropriate in the face of the political process concerns that pay-to-
stay fees present. Consider the argument that the Excessive Fines
Clause should be liberally construed because of the “potential
governmental abuses that predictably could flow from institutional
incentives to impose excessive monetary punishment.”199 Unlike
detention, or other punishments such as revocation of privileges, the
legislature has incentives to institute financial penalties when those
penalties result in money for government.200
This seems particularly true when those financial consequences
are borne by a politically unpopular group, such as prisoners.201
Because of this unpopularity, there are political incentives in
addition to financial ones: by shifting the burden of incarceration
cost from voting constituents (who presumably are pleased, for
example, not to see their taxes raised) to prisoners, legislators can
score political points.202 With both financial and political incentives
weighing on the side of potential legislative abuse, it makes sense
that the judiciary should take on a more active checking function
regarding these pay-to-stay fines; thus, legislative deference in the
face of utter inability to pay is inappropriate. In sum, because the
history of the Clause supports it, because it is not inconsistent with
the Court’s current doctrine, and because process concerns require
it, courts should consider the “deprivation of livelihood” or “ability
to pay” when evaluating pay-to-stay fees under the Excessive Fines
Clause.
B. The Private Prison Puzzle
Fees in private prisons will pose one further problem under the
Excessive Fines Clause. Even assuming that prisoners are able to
broaden their ability to seek relief from pay-to-stay fees under the
Eighth Amendment by arguing that (1) the fees are at least
199. Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines
Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After United States v.
Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 514.
200. Cf. id. at 513-14 (discussing process issues in the context of civil asset forfeiture).
201. See Colgan, supra note 1, at 22-23.
202. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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partially punitive and (2) that courts should adopt “ability to pay”
as a factor in the grossly disproportional test,203 another piece of the
Excessive Fines Clause doctrine will work against occupants of
privately run state prisons. Recall that the Court has defined a fine
as “payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.”204
This “to a sovereign” requirement places a meaningful obstacle
between some prisoners and relief from excessive fines. Because the
requirement seems to suggest that only payments directly to the
government are qualifying fines under the Eighth Amendment, one
may assume that fees paid to private prison-industry contractors
are outside the Clause’s protective shield.205
Were this the case, consider the scale of the affected population.
Private prison use has skyrocketed over the past few decades, with
the ACLU noting that “the number of prisoners in private prisons
increased by approximately 1600% between 1990 and 2009.”206
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), in 2017, five
states held 20 percent or more of their state prison populations in
privately run facilities.207 In total, the DOJ estimated that 93,851
state prisoners were serving their time in private facilities.208
Returning to an example cited in Part I, the state of Florida held an
estimated 11,676 prisoners (or 12 percent of the total state prison
population) in private facilities.209 This is a sizeable population that,
under the current understanding of the Excessive Fines Clause,
203. See discussion supra Parts III.A.1-2.
204. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)
(emphasis added).
205. See, e.g., Colgan, supra note 1, at 24-25 (noting that the use of private companies in
the prison industry “can result in the imposition of fees payable to private entities for pre- and
post-trial incarceration, probation and collections, electronic monitoring, [and] mandated
chemical dependency.... If the Court retains the restriction that fines must be paid to a
sovereign government, none of these fees would constitute fines” (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)).
206. ACLU, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 5 (2011),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LU9-CAJL].
207. JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2017 16 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2YHV-VPRH] (stating the five states were “Montana (38%), Hawaii (28%),
Tennessee (26%), Oklahoma (26%), and Arizona (20%)”).
208. Id. at 25. This number is equal to 7.2 percent of the total state prison population. See
id.
209. Id.
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would face an insurmountable obstacle to constitutional relief. This
Section argues that the government’s “prosecutorial power” is suffi-
ciently implicated in the case of prisoners held in private prisons.
Therefore, the purposes of the Clause and the Court’s own state-
ments support granting this subset of the population meaningful
Eighth Amendment rights.
1. Browning-Ferris Industries, Paroline, and the 
“To A Sovereign” Requirement
The Court has declared that an excessive fine must be “to a
sovereign.”210 But in Paroline v. United States, the Court signaled a
willingness to stretch this definition beyond its governmental
understanding.211 Paroline was not an Excessive Fines Clause case;
the Court granted certiorari to address a causation requirement for
restitution related to child pornography.212 But in evaluating the
proposed causation requirement, which would have resulted in each
possessor of the pornographic material being held individually liable
for all damages caused by all possessors, the Court observed:
That approach is so severe it might raise questions under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. To be sure,
this Court has said that “the Excessive Fines Clause was
intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and
payable to, the government.” But while restitution under [the
statute] is paid to a victim, it is imposed by the Government “at
the culmination of a criminal proceeding and requires conviction
of an underlying” crime. Thus, despite the differences between
restitution and a traditional fine, restitution still implicates the
“prosecutorial powers of government.”213
This dicta points to the Court’s willingness to consider a fine
within the Clause when the fine “results from the government’s
210. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
211. 572 U.S. 434, 455-56 (2014).
212. Id. at 443.
213. Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989); then quoting United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998); and then quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at
275).
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power to criminally prosecute.”214 When the government prosecutes
a defendant, it brings the full weight of the government’s prose-
cutorial power to bear on that defendant—the exact power the
Clause was meant to limit.215 The Paroline dicta suggests that
prosecutorial action is enough on its own; any punitive fines
resulting therefrom, and predicated on conviction, would be subject
to the Clause.216
Though Paroline discussed restitution specifically,217 this same
logic would apply to sufficiently high daily fees for the cost of
incarceration in private prison. These fees are the result of prosecu-
tion, conviction, and sentencing by the government, and fees
charged for incarceration require the conviction of an underlying
crime.218 This result is consistent with the Clause’s history and
purpose for the same reasons discussed in Part III.A above,219
because the Clause would still prevent ruinous fees charged as a
result of the government’s prosecution.220
Moreover, process concerns support the application of the Clause
to daily fees in private prisons as well. The powerful financial
incentives inherent in financial punishment221 are also present in
privatization arrangements because these arrangements allow the
government to avoid spending excessive tax revenue on the now-
privatized facilities and services.222 Indeed, this monetary benefit
could result in political benefits as well as financial. In short, any
interpretation of the Clause that excludes these arrangements
serves the government’s own financial interests while “mak[ing] an
end run around the Excessive Fines Clause, leaving those subjected
214. Kevin Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 LA. L. REV. 21, 36
(2016) (discussing the application of the Clause to restitution payments).
215. See Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 266.
216. See supra note 213 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 136-39 and
accompanying text.
217. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 443.
218. See supra Part I. This obviously does not hold true for any daily fees charged during
pretrial detention, which are outside the scope of this Note.
219. See supra Part III.A.
220. See supra notes 70-71, 136-39, 187-88 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 
222. Colgan, supra note 1, at 28.
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to economic sanctions without an avenue for redress that would be
available but for the privatization.”223
Of course, the Court has interpreted the history of the Clause to
require some limitations on its scope, and in Browning-Ferris
Industries, it chose not to apply the Clause to suits between private
parties.224 Therefore, the Court may continue to decline to eliminate
the “to a sovereign” restriction entirely.225 However, by tweaking the
restriction in the way Paroline suggests (to those payments
implicating “prosecutorial power”),226 the Court could remain true
to those limiting principles while still preventing the government
from exploiting a technicality to render the Clause obsolete through
privatization.
2. Proposing an Alternative Doctrinal Requirement: 
An “Essential Government Function” Test
Given the Court’s concern in Browning-Ferris Industries about
limiting the scope of the Clause,227 it is possible the Court will
decline to find that Paroline’s “prosecutorial powers” dicta alone can
carry the weight of a constitutional remedy for the thousands of
citizens controlled by private prison-industry contractors. “Prosecu-
torial powers,” after all, could be construed broadly—to encompass
restitution, for instance, or actions where the government is merely
a party.
Therefore, to address any concerns that the “prosecutorial
powers” test may broaden the scope of the Clause too far, this Note
proposes an alternative doctrinal requirement: a fine under the
Clause must be paid to a sovereign, or to an “entity performing an
essential government function at the government’s behest.” This
modification, modeled off of existing state action doctrine,228 would
223. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted).
224. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
225. See, e.g., Colgan, supra note 1, at 29 (supporting the elimination of the to-a-sovereign
restriction).
226. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 456 (2014).
227. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989).
228. See, e.g., Robert S. Gilmour & Laura S. Jensen, Reinventing Government Account-
ability: Public Functions, Privatization, and the Meaning of “State Action,” 58 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 247, 250 (1998).
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expand the reach of the Clause’s protection beyond pure government
actors to include those the government empowers to perform the
core government function of law enforcement. This test, made an
explicit part of Clause doctrine, should be liberally construed
because of the “need for exacting judicial review of ... monetary
penalties” due to the particular incentives for abuse.229
This modification may seem dramatic; it is technically ahistorical.
But this caveat in the doctrine serves the spirit of the Clause:
protecting vulnerable citizens from ruinous fines resulting from
adversarial proceedings against the government. Further, it would
do so while acknowledging the changing landscape of the American
justice system: increasingly, jurisdictions are using private contrac-
tors for fee-based pre- and post-conviction criminal justice
services.230 The intent of this “essential government function” test
is to sweep up private entities who have contracted with the
government to perform a necessary law enforcement function, while
at the same time avoiding the temptation to extend the Clause’s
protection to every action that comes into a courtroom.
This new prong in the doctrine is vulnerable to the same kinds of
criticisms as existing state action doctrine. It leaves tremendous
room for judicial discretion, the lines defining a “function” can be
fuzzy, and the test is difficult to consistently employ.231 All this is
true. Yet, there is something fundamentally unsettling about the
idea that these criticisms are sufficient reason to reject such a
reform. In an era of increasing privatization, should the courts
withdraw a constitutional protection from the people because the
alternative to that withdrawal is a new test that might be difficult
to apply?
The Court’s willingness to apply difficult tests to protect other
constitutional rights suggests that this objection should carry little
weight. The Court is “often called upon to resolve questions of
constitutional law not susceptible to the mechanical application of
bright and clear lines”;232 this problem is not unique to the state
229. Johnson, supra note 199, at 513-14.
230. Colgan, supra note 1, at 24.
231. See, e.g., Gilmour & Jensen, supra note 228, at 248-51 (describing the “judicial
confusion” surrounding state action doctrine and its “idiosyncratic” application).
232. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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action doctrine or the Excessive Fines Clause.233 If a test is fuzzy,
yet it helps enforce the fundamental demands of a constitutional
clause, then courts should apply the test in spite of its flaws.234 The
alternative—undermining the right—is unacceptable. As the Court
itself has acknowledged, it “‘cannot avoid the obligation to draw
lines, often close and difficult lines’ in adjudicating constitutional
rights.”235
The need for judicial management of these “close and difficult
lines” is especially acute for prisoners. Private prison contractors
have a high level of authority over prisoners; they control when
prisoners sleep, what they eat, and where they can spend their
waking hours.236 Such is the nature of prison—but with that level of
control must come accountability. Otherwise, if private entities like
these contractors do not have to follow constitutional rules,
“delegating authority to private parties may allow the government
to do through them what it cannot do itself.”237
What the government cannot do itself is clear: it must not impose
excessive fines.238 This is the command of eight centuries of legal
touchstones and a virtually undebated amendment to the United
States Constitution.239 The government should not get around this
edict now by hiring someone else to impose those fines in its stead.
In view of the modern phenomenon of pay-to-stay fees,240 the ever-
growing private prison system,241 and the consequences of criminal
justice debt,242 Excessive Fines Clause doctrine can and should be
233. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 49 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(observing that questions of “[d]ue process ... embod[y] principles of fairness rather than
immutable [rules] as to every aspect of a criminal trial” (emphasis added)).
234. Cf. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (“Although the endorsement test requires careful and
often difficult line-drawing and is highly context specific, no alternative test has been sug-
gested that captures the essential mandate of the Establishment Clause as well as the en-
dorsement test does, and it warrants continued application and refinement.”).
235. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting County of Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
236. See Carona, supra note 39, at 1-2.
237. Gilmour & Jensen, supra note 228, at 248.
238. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
239. See supra Part II.A.
240. See supra Part I.
241. See ACLU, supra note 206.
242. Bannon et al., supra note 50, at 5.
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adjusted to protect the politically vulnerable among us who have
been ruined by fines, regardless of who oversees their government-
imposed punishment.
CONCLUSION
Since Timbs v. Indiana in 2019, it is beyond dispute that the
Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states.243 This Note proposes
to build on this knowledge by finding room in the ambiguities of the
existing Excessive Fines Clause doctrine to provide prisoners, in
both government-run and private facilities, with more opportunity
to challenge state and county pay-to-stay fees in court.
Using the current understanding of the doctrine, prisoners can
present reasonable arguments that pay-to-stay fees constitute fines
in certain situations, and with an “ability to pay/deprivation of
livelihood” prong added to the “grossly disproportional” test, poor
and indigent prisoners will have a better chance to obtain constitu-
tional relief. This is desirable for both moral and policy reasons.
Poorer defendants should not be punished more than other defen-
dants for similar crimes, and insurmountable debt is a pathway to
recidivism.244 Finally, the doctrine should be liberally construed to
account for state and county prisoners in privately operated facil-
ities, who must not be left out in the constitutional cold because of
the facility in which they were placed.
It is true that some interpretations and doctrinal shifts proposed
in this Note are not necessarily within the current understanding
of the Clause. But “[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
This is particularly true of constitutions.”245 The Court in Browning-
Ferris Industries acknowledged this principle to be true but held it
had no bearing upon fines that were not “strictly modern
creation[s]” and had a “solid grounding in pre-Revolutionary
243. See 139 S. Ct. 682, 686-87 (2019).
244. See supra Part III.A.2.
245. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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days.”246 Pay-to-stay fees are indeed a modern mischief.247 They
require a modern Constitution to meet them.
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